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LEGALIZING ASSASSINATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Should the United States government adopt an official policy to approve of
the assassination, by its intelligence agencies, of known terrorists who are a
threat to U.S. national interests? This is the central question that this work will
address.
Although recently this question would for many have triggered an
instinctive negative response, the question has become a legitimate area of
debate and consideration. This debate, however, has been clouded by a lack
of clarity in the terms and ideas explored. There is significant disagreement
as to what "terrorism" actually means. Accordingly, this work will address
two definitional questions. First, what exactly is terrorism? This article
provides a brief common-sense definition as well as an overview of the
dangers that acts of terrorism pose to the United States and the international
community. Second, this article will explore the term "assassination." As this
word is likely to trigger a visceral response, it is crucial to establish a precise
and consistent definition of the term "assassination" before substantive
analysis is performed.'
Addressing the legality of officially sanctioned assassination under both
international law and United States law will be a major focus of this work.
Although assassination has traditionally been considered a violation of
international law, the author will highlight recent changes and theories which
suggest a possible evolution in this regard. Specifically, the author addresses
the question whether the traditional jurisprudence of the 18th and 19th
centuries, which banned the assassination of heads of state, is applicable to the
dangers faced by modem nations in the guise of terrorism. Next, the author
will address the fact that United States intelligence agencies are prohibited
from conducting assassinations. Surprisingly, U.S. intelligence agencies are
not prohibited by law from conducting assassinations; rather, they are
' Assassination has generally been defined as murder, usually of a political, royal, or public
person. The origins of the word come from the order of the Assassins, a Muslim sect of the
eleventh and twelfth centuries, whose members furthered their own political interests by
murdering high officials. The word is derived from assassiyun, Arabic for fundamentalists, from
the word assass, foundation. See LINDA LAUCELLA, ASSASSINATION: THEPOLITICSOF MURDER
(1998) at ix. To quote one legal scholar, "The greatest obstacle to clarity of thought and
expression in distinguishing assassination from tyrannicide is the lack of an agreed-upon
definition of assassination ..... A review of the literature in the field reveals a stunning
imprecision in the use of the term 'assassination.' " Thomas C. Wingfield, Taking Aim at
Regime Estates: Assassination, Tyrannicide and the Clancy Doctrine, 22 MD. J. INT'L L. &
TRADE 287, 295 (1998-99).
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prohibited by a revocable order of the president. Attempts by the United
States Congress, including the work of the Church Committee, to state an
official governmental policy regarding assassination will be examined in
detail.
The current inquiry will also require a special focus on the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and, specifically, its covert action arm-the
Directorate of Operations (DO).
Lastly, this work will discuss public policy considerations regarding
forcible responses to terrorists who target U.S. citizens and national interests.
II. TERMS USED AND DEFINED IN THIS WORK
A. Defining "TERRORISM" and its Unique Threat to the United States
WHAT IS TERRORISM?
Terrorism is prohibited under both U.S. and international law. The U.N.
General Assembly and a majority of nations have unequivocally condemned
as criminal all acts of terrorism, wherever and by whomever committed.2
Oddly enough, there has been very little agreement on the definition of
"terrorism;" academics, governments, and international bodies have struggled
with a definition that incorporates all of the various forms of terrorism. For
the purposes of this paper, a terrorist attack will be distinguished by three
specific qualities:
1. violence, whether actual or threatened;
2. a "political" objective, however conceived; and
3. an intended audience-typically, although not necessarily,
a wide one.'
Political motivation for purposes of this argument will also include
religious or ethnic motivations. The legal scholars, Professors Arend and
Beck, define terrorism as "the threat or use of violence with the intent of
2 See INTERNATIONAL LAW, Pugh (ed.) at 368, citing U.N.G.A. Res. 40/61, 9 December
1985. See also Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of
Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of International Significance, Feb. 2,
1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, 10 1.L.M. 255.
See Anthony Arend & Robert Beck, Don't Tread on Us: International Law and Forcible
State Response to Terrorism, 12 WIS. INT'L L.J. 153, 162 (1994).
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causing fear in a target group in order to achieve political objectives." 4 The
author will adopt this definition for the purposes of the current inquiry.
Under U.S. domestic law, an act of terrorism is defined as an activity that:
(a) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life
that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or
of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if commit-
ted within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;
and;
(b) appears to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a
government by assassination or kidnapping.5
The State Department defines terrorism as the "threat or use of violence for
political purposes by individuals or groups,' whether acting for, or in opposi-
tion to, established governmental authority, when such actions are intended to
shock, stun, or intimidate a target from wider than the immediate victims."
It is readily apparent that in the realms of academics, law enforcement, and
diplomacy, the definitions of terrorism are similar, yet they vary.
Connected with definitional issues are concepts of state support. Iraq, Iran,
and Libya have been considered "rogue states," due in part to their alleged
support of international terrorism. However, there are obviously differing
levels of support by sovereign states for "terrorists," and it would be helpful
for purposes of the current inquiry to gain a better understanding of the degree
to which a state can be considered to actively support international terrorism.
According to some international legal scholars, there are six degrees of
association between terrorists and supporting nations, namely (from most
supportive to least):
1. terrorist acts performed by actual state officials;
2. state employment of unofficial agents for terrorist acts;
3. state supply of financial aid or weapons;
4. state supply of logistical support;
4 Id. at 163.
' 18 U.S.C. § 3077 (2000).
6 Arend & Beck, supra note 3, at 163 n.45 (citing Office of Combating Terrorism, U.S.
Dept. of State, PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (1982)).
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5. state acquiescence to the presence of terrorists bases
within its territory; and
6. state provision of neither active nor passive help."
For the purpose of the current analysis, it is not necessary to find one "correct"
definition of terrorism. However, it is appropriate to use one common
meaning consistently and which reflects the essence of the various definitions.
For the present purposes, terrorism will be used to describe violence, whether
actual or threatened, used for a political/religious objective, in order to affect
an intended audience, and thereby to alter an issue of public policy.
The issue of state involvement is somewhat more difficult, but no less
important. The fundamental question at issue is whether the U.S. government
should be allowed to use deadly force against a known terrorist who is a threat
to the lives of United States citizens. If a head of state is actively supporting
terrorists, the question becomes more confused and troubling. As this article
will discuss, the concept of the legality of assassination has been handled
differently depending on whether the country is at peace or during times of
war. Furthermore, under specific international treaties, heads of states and
other diplomatic personnel are provided specific and strong protections from
this contemplated form of violence. Therefore, in an attempt to maintain the
purity of the analysis, the term "terrorists" will not be used herein to refer to
heads of state or other scenarios where the level of state support is sufficiently
high to equate the terrorist with an official state actor.
B. The Threat of Terrorism in the Modern World
The threat of terrorism in the modem world is difficult to overstate.
However, the frequency with which terrorist acts occur appeared to have
created a callousness or insensitivity among many. Much has been written in
regard to the end of the Cold War model and its related stability, and the
beginning of the "new age" of terrorism.' There is nothing new about
terrorism, however, the threat has been increased exponentially due to the
potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Today, terrorists are
feared not only because of their sniper's rifle or car bomb, but also due to their
access to biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
7 Arend & Beck, supra note 3, at 163 (citing Professor Antonio Cassese).
' See. e.g., Louis Ren6 Beres, On International Law & Nuclear Terrorism, 24 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 1 (1994).
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America, which has long felt protected on its own shores, has begun to
experience the pain of international terrorism. The attack on the World Trade
Center in New York in 1993 was, to many, an uncomfortable awakening. The
destruction of United States embassies in Africa in 1998 further elucidates the
threat to American interests due to terrorists. The tragic events of Sept. 11,
2001 have shattered any remaining illusions as to U.S. vulnerability.
The State Department issues regular reports regarding international
terrorism. In the 2000 report on the Patterns of Global Terrorism, the State
Department indicated that:
There were 423 international terrorist attacks in 2000, an
increase of 8 percent from the 392 attacks recorded during
1999. The main reason for the increase was an upsurge in the
number of bombings of a multinational oil pipeline in
Colombia by two terrorist groups there. The pipeline was
bombed 152 times, producing in the Latin American region
the largest increase in terrorist attacks from the previous year,
from 121 to 193. Western Europe saw the largest de-
crease-from 85 to 30--owing to fewer attacks in Germany,
Greece, and Italy as well as to the absence of any attacks in
Turkey.
The number of casualties caused by terrorists also increased
in 2000. During the year, 405 persons were killed and 791
were wounded, up from the 1999 totals of 233 dead and 706
wounded.
The number of anti-U.S. attacks rose from 169 in 1999 to
200 in 2000, a result of the increase in bombing attacks
against the oil pipeline in Colombia, which is viewed by the
terrorists as a US target.
Nineteen US citizens were killed in acts of international
terrorism in 2000. Seventeen were sailors who died in the
attack against the USS Cole on 12 October in the Yemeni port
of Aden.9
As previously stated, the United States has traditionally felt more secure
from terrorist threats then many of our allies. The facts described above
9 The United States Department of State, THE YEAR IN REVIEW: PATTERNS OF GLOBAL
TERRORIsM 2000 (Aug. 8,2001), athttp://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/index.cfin?docid=
2420.
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clearly demonstrate that terrorism poses a very serious threat to American
interests and lives. The recent vicious attacks on U.S. soil have removed all
doubt. Furthermore, acts of transnational terrorism trigger responses which,
themselves, may further destabilize international peace and security. State
reactions to international acts of terrorism have involved abductions of
suspected terrorists, assassinations of particular terrorists, military strikes
against terrorist bases, and military strikes against states allegedly involved in
terrorism.'0 Just as importantly, there is little evidence that the threat of
terrorist action will decline in the future. It is due to this truly frightening
situation of significant international violence, mixed with new access to
WMD, that the US position on appropriate responses to terrorism must be
continually re-evaluated.
The United Nations' various constitutional organs have clearly stated the
dangers to international peace and security posed by terrorist actions. The
U.N. Security Council has addressed the question of national sovereignty, the
prohibition on the use of force under the Charter and the issue of state
sponsored terrorism after the Lockerbie, Scotland bombing." In the preamble
to U.N. Security Council Resolution 748, which imposed economic sanctions
on Libya, it was set forth that:
in accordance with the principle of Article 2, paragraph 4 of
the Charter of the United Nations, every state has the duty to
refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating
in terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized
activities within its territory directed toward the commission
of such acts, when such acts involve a threat or use of force. 2
There is no reasonable doubt that transnational terrorism is prohibited
under both U.S. and international law, and that it is one of the most significant
threats to international peace and security.
C. Assassination Defined
If assassination is defined as a form of murder, aper se criminal act, then
assassination itself must be unlawful and there is little need for further legal
10 See Arend & Beck, supra note 3, at 174.
II See Arend & Beck, supra note 3, at 171, 172.
12 U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc 7 (1992).
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analysis. 3 Furthermore, much of the recent debate concerning assassination
has focused on a contextual definition turning on the question of whether the
country is in a state of war. If this is the case, and assuming that it is
impossible to be in a state of war with private terrorists (as opposed to another
nation), then any analysis will be abbreviated. Again, if the traditional notion
of assassination under international law is used, then the term will be
understood to apply primarily to a head of state, and an in-depth legal and
policy analysis will become unnecessary due to recent international treaties
which extend protections to heads of state from use of force by other nations
when not in a state of war. Furthermore, as noted, "heads of state" have been
excluded from the definition of "terrorists" for the purpose of the present
analysis. That is to say, if we define assassination as a crime, then it is not
necessary to investigate whether it may be a legal foreign policy tool. Further,
as per much of the current literature available, assassination viewed in the
context of the Laws of War is not terribly helpful as, by almost complete
consensus, a nation may not be in a state of war with non-state actors (and
such non-state actors are the focus of the current inquiry). 4
For the present purposes, the term "assassination" will be used to signify
the targeted"5 killing of an individual, by an official agent of a nation,
regardless of whether a state of war exists.' 6 An "official agent" for the current
" See Websters II, NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY, (1994) (defining assassinate
as "1. To murder (a prominent person). 2. To destroy or injure (e.g. an opponent's character)
treacherously.").
14 Cf Daniel Pickard, When Does Crime Become a Threat to International Peace and
Security, 12 FLA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1998) (exploring this issue).
" See Michael N. Schmitt, State Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic
Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 609, at n. 1 (1992) ("In military parlance a 'target' is a specific object
of attack, and 'targeting' involves directing operations toward the attack of a target.").
6 This definition involves the political element essential to the concept by incorporating
state involvement in the definition but does not needlessly include concepts of perfidy and
treachery which are more applicable to the laws of war and earlier thoughts on this matter. See
Chris Anderson, Comment, 13 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y 291, 294 (1992) (stating that a
general definition of assassination is the murder of a targeted individual for political purposes
and that another definition is any unlawful killing of a particular person for political purposes);
Although none of the domestic or international instruments proscribing
assassination actually defines the prohibited conduct, scholars and practitio-
ners have struggled to craft a working definition to serve as a guide to states
in fashioning their behavior, and also as a prescriptive norm against which
other states could judge and possibly sanction that behavior. Some scholars
focus on the killing of internationally protected persons or high-level political
figures. Others ignore the victim's status and instead focus on the purpose of
the act and presence of any political motivations. Still others tend to
analogize assassination to the classic law-of-war prohibition of treacherously
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analysis will generally either apply to a member of the military or of the
intelligence community (generally in the latter sense an employee or contract
agent of the Central Intelligence Agency, as will be explored further below).
D. Conclusion
As stated above, for the purposes of the current discussion, terrorism will
be defined as acts of violence, whether actual or threatened, used for a
political/religious objective, in order to affect an intended audience, to alter an
issue of public policy. There should be no question as to the severity of the
threat of terrorist action to the United States and to international peace and
security.
The definition of the word assassination is almost as controversial as the
concept. For the present purposes, the term "assassination" will be used to
signify the targeted killing by an official agent of a nation of another
individual, regardless of whether a state of war exists, and will specifically
exclude heads of state as potential targets. The focus of this article will
specifically address whether it is permissible for the United States government
to authorize the assassination of a foreign terrorist outside of the territorial
United States by a member of its intelligence community (or a member of the
armed forces acting at the direction of the intelligence community) under both
U.S. law and international law.
III. THE TRADITIONAL PROHIBITION OF ASSASSINATION
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Doctrine of Positivism
Legal scholars have argued that assassination is absolutely prohibited under
international law, including acts of counter-terrorism."7 This may not be an
accurate statement.
To best understand the traditional prohibition against assassination, it is
proper to restate a fundamental doctrine of international law. That is, "the
doctrine of positivism... teaches that international law is the sum of the rules
by which states have consented to be bound, and that nothing can be law to
killing one's enemy. (citations omitted)
Michael N. Schmitt, State-Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law, 17
YALE J. INT'L L. 609, 611-12 (1992)
17 See Bert Brandenburg, Legality ofAssassination, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 655 (1987).
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which they have not consented . . .,,8 "In the absence of a legal norm
restricting a particular state behavior, sovereign states may act as they
choose."' 9 In other words, unless the existence of a rule prohibiting a specific
action can be established, states are permitted to engage in that action. "For
example, a state's use of armed force against alleged 'terrorists' bases in
response to a prior armed attack would be permissible unless it could be
proven that states had earlier consented to a rule prohibiting such a forcible
action. '
Thus under the generally accepted theory of positivism, unless there is an
accepted prohibition against assassination of terrorists under international law,
states are permitted to engage in this behavior. A substantive body of
international law regulating the use of force within the sovereign territory of
another nation exists and is addressed in the next section of this article.
B. Prohibitions on the State Use of Force Under Current International Law
and Authorization by the UN Security Council
For the purposes of the current analyses, it would be appropriate to briefly
discuss the general prohibitions on the use of force under current international
law.2 It is first observed that the United Nations Charter has been established
as the dominant international legal paradigm concerning the "use of force."
Article 103 of the United Nations Charter ("The Charter" or "The U.N.
Charter") states that it supersedes all other international obligations. It reads,.
"In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligations under the present charter shall
prevail."22 Consequently, questions of the legality of the use of force under
international law must be examined as provided for under the framework of
the U.N. Charter.
The U.N. Charter establishes a general prohibition on the use of force in
Article 2(4): "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independ-
' Arend & Beck, supra note 3, at 158 (citing Brierly, at 51).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 159. The authors state that "they accept the positivist distinction between "legal"
and "moral." Hence, while state actions may be morally reprehensible, they may not be legally
prohibited. Naturalist legal scholars, of course, reject this view." Id. at n.24.
21 See generally Daniel Pickard, When Does Crime Become a Threat to International Peace
and Security, 12 FLA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1998).
' U.N. CHARTER art. 103, para. 2.
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ence of any state, or in any other matter inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."' The first "purpose" listed for the United Nations is "to
maintain international peace and security and, to that end, to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace."24
The U.N. Charter contains four explicit exceptions to the Article 2(4)
prohibition on the use of force, namely force that is: (1) used in self-defense;
(2) authorized by the Security Council; (3) undertaken by the five major
powers before the Security Council is functional; and (4) undertaken against
the 'enemy' states of the Second World War.2"
Under Article 39, the Security Council is empowered to "determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression."'
If the Security Council determines that there has been such a threat to, or a
breach of, the peace, it may under Article 42 authorize members of the United
Nations to use force.2
" Id. art. 2, para. 4.
24 Id. art. 1, para. 1.
25 See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE USE OF
FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 31 (1993).
26 Id. at 31-32. A determination of a threat to international peace and security is solely
within the province of the Security Council. The members of the Security Council have issued
statements explicitly stating that acts of terrorism may rise to the level of threats to international
peace and security. This determination is crucial in that it may result in the use of military might
by one or more nations. Once the Security Council has identified a threat to international peace
and security, the Charter lays out a framework for the authorization of force. Article 41 provides
that:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call
upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may
include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea,
air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the
severance of diplomatic relations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 41. This Article authorizes the Security Council to impose non-military
sanctions to include, but are not limited to those mentioned. Id. at 48.
27 See U.N. CHARTER art. 39 ("The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations,
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security.').
If measures under Article 41 are deemed insufficient by the Security Council, military
sanctions can be authorized in accordance with Article 42:
Should the Security Council consider that the measures provided for in
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstra-
tions, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members
[Vol. 30:1
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Under the Charter framework, it is conceivable that an international
terrorist organization could be identified by the Security Council as a threat to
international peace and security. Accordingly, under the powers of Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter, member nations could subsequently be authorized to
use military force to remove such a threat. This topic although timely and
intriguing, is beyond the scope of the current analysis. If the U.N. Security
Council authorized the extra-territorial use of force, then it may be argued that
such use of force was per se lawful. Because this contributes little to the
analysis, the current inquiry must focus instead on the question of whether the
targeted killing of a foreign terrorist may be legally justified outside of express
authorization of the U.N. Security Council.
It may be argued that the contemplated actions may be legally justified
through the concept of self-defense under international law. The U.N. Charter
allows for the use of force by a nation for the purposes of self-defense."
Codification of the customary law right of self-defense is found in both
Articles 2(4) and 51. The question of the right to self-defense as a basis for
responding to terrorism will be addressed in further detail below.
of the United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
28 See Schmitt, supra note 15, at 649-50, who states as to self-defense:
In summary, a state generally may target those reasonably believed to
represent a violent threat to it. If the attack has not occurred, the right to
anticipate the attack arises at the point at which the threat can last be thwarted
effectively. On the other hand, if the attack is continuing, the timing of the
defensive action is irrelevant. It must be emphasized, however, that the
previous discussion bears on the issue of assassination only with regard to the
likelihood that a killing might indicate political motivation in nonarmed-
conflict circumstances. To the extent an action does not meet the standards
of self-defense, it might be politically motivated, and therefore might be
considered assassination. If the action is a valid exercise of self-defense, it
is not (legally) politically motivated. Additionally, if an act in self-defense
rises to the level of armed conflict, the only issue as to assassination is
treachery.
Schmitt involves concepts of political motivation and/or treachery in the definition of
assassination. It is questionable if these definitional requirements help to clarify the legal
analysis. However, Schmitt indicates that states should not be prevented from acting in self-
defense by targeting individual terrorists. id.
2001]
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C. The Evolution of Thought on Assassination Under International Law
1. Early Thought-Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Jurisprudence
Under traditional concepts of international law, assassination was generally
considered as a prohibited tactic of war. One legal scholar has recently argued
that there has been a considerable evolution in thought in regard to the use of
assassination as a tactic in time of war. 9 A summary of her observations
follows:
"Assassination as a tactic of war was a subject frequently discussed by
[legal scholars] in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries."30 The traditional
view of the law of war asserted that a leader or a particular member of an
opposing army did not enjoy absolute protection, or that he was not a
legitimate target of attack. The primary focus was on the "manner and
circumstances in which these individuals could be killed, [concluding] that
they [may] not be subject to a treacherous attack. The writings of most reflect
concern that the honor of arms be preserved, and that public order and the
safety of sovereigns and generals not be unduly threatened."'I
Alberico Gentili writing in the seventeenth century considered three
possibilities in regard to assassination: "(1) the incitement of subjects to kill
a sovereign; (2) a secret or treacherous attack upon an individual enemy; and
(3) an open attack on an unarmed enemy not on the field of battle. Gentili
concluded that each of these actions was to be condemned."32 The predomi-
nant rationale was:
the danger to individuals and general disorder that would
result if opposing sides plotted the deaths of each other's
leaders. Just as important, however was the absence of valor
[and honor].... Gentili expressly rejected the suggestion that
by killing a single leader many other lives might be saved,
believing that such an argument ignored considerations of
justice and honor.3
29 See Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the Law ofArmed Conflict, 134 MIL. L. REv. 123,
at 125 (1991).
" Id. at 125.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 126 (citing A. Gentili, De Jure Belli Lilori Tres (1612) reprinted in 16(2) The
Classics of International Law 166 (J. Rolfe trans. 1933)) [hereinafter Gentili].
3' Id. at 126 (citing Gentili at 170-72).
(Vol. 30:1
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Hugo Grotius specifically considered the question of "whether, according
to the law of nations, it is permissible to kill an enemy by sending an assassin
against him." '34 Grotius:
distinguished between assassins who violated an express or
tacit obligation of good faith (such as subjects against their
king) and assassins who have no such obligation. Grotius
considered it permissible under the law of nature and nations
to kill an enemy in any place whatsoever, though he con-
demned killing by treachery or through the use of the treach-
ery of another.... [Grotius' reasoning against] the use of
treachery in regard to assassination was (that) the (rule)
prevented dangers to persons of particular eminence from
becoming excessive."
Grotius believed that one attribute of sovereignty was the
right to wage war, and that the prohibition of treacherous
assassination applied only in the context of a 'public war'
against a sovereign enemy. Treachery used in fighting
enemies who were not sovereign, such as 'robbers and
pirates,' while not morally blameless, Grotius said, "goes
unpunished among nations by reason of hatred of those
against whom it is practiced.
35
This author will continue to pose the question throughout this work: What
are terrorists, if not the pirates of the twenty-first century?
Additionally, although an examination of writings by the early scholars of
international law are helpful in casting light on the evolution of thought in this
regard, it is suggested that concepts relevant to a discussion of assassination
have progressed beyond what these commentators could have envisaged.36
The eighteenth century legal scholar Vattel defined assassination as
"treacherous murder," which was described as "infamous and execrable, both
in him who executes it and in him who commands it."'37 This is in contrast to
"4 Zengel, supra note 29, at 127 (citing H. GROTIUs, DE JURE BELLI Ac PActs LIBRI TRES
(rev. ed. 1646), reprinted in 3(2) THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 653 (F. Kelsey trans.
1925)).
" Id. at 127 (citing Grotius at 653-56) (emphasis added).
36 See Schmitt, supra note 15, at 617 n.32 (stating that "the nature of war has changed so
much in recent years that the views of the European scholars arguably have only nominal
bearing on contemporary norms. The initiation of war, for instance, was legal under customary
law at the time of these historical writings.").
37 Zengel, supra note 29, at 128.
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Bynkershoek who argued that every force in war was lawful, and that the use
of poison, assassination or incendiary bombs was lawful in the destruction of
an unarmed enemy.38 The position that everything is legitimate against an
enemy in time of war has been universally condemned in modem times.39
Vattell agreed with philosopher Jean-Jacques Rosseau that assassination
and the use of poison in war were contrary to both customary law and the law
of nature. 40 Christian Wolff, another international legal scholar, stood
somewhere between Vattel and Bynkershoek in his view of what was unlawful
in war. While the law of nature dictated that a prince fighting a just war
neither should kill, nor should injure the noncombatant subjects of his enemy,
Wolff noted that the customs of certain nations gave a general license to kill
all enemy subjects. Unlike Vattel, Wolff regarded assassination, the use of
poison, the plundering of private property and the destruction of flour, food,
and drink permissible under the law of nature.4'
Zengel concludes that:
The consensus of these early commentators that an attack
directed at an enemy, including an enemy leader, with the
intent of killing him was generally permissible, but not if the
attack was a treacherous one. Treachery was defined as
betrayal by one owing an obligation of good faith to the
intended victim. Grotius and Vattel also objected to making
use of another's treachery. Bynkershoek, however, did
not. .. . Gentili dissented, in effect declaring any secret
attack to be treacherous, and limiting permissible attacks
upon enemy leaders to those on, or in close proximity to, the
battlefield. The reasons given for restricting the manner in
which an enemy might be attacked personally generally
involved perceptions of what constituted honorable warfare,
together with a desire to protect kings and generals. Implicit
in the latter [argument] is the premise that making war was a
See Burrus M. Carnahan, Reason, Retaliation and Rhetoric; Jefferson & the Quest for
Humanity in War, 139 MIL. L. REV. 83, 85 (1993).
'9 See Zengel, supra note 29, at 128. The atrocities of the Nazi's and the subsequent legal
standards expounded upon by the International Military Tribunals following World War II have
clearly demonstrated that not all tactics of war conform with international law. The Geneva
Conventions of 1949, which have generally been accepted as binding international law, establish
that not all means of injuring an enemy are acceptable.
40 See Carnahan, supra note 38, at 83-84.
41 CHisTiAN WOLFF, THE LAW OF NATIONS TREATED ACCORDING TOA SCIENTIFIC METHOD
409-50 (F. Helmelt, trans., Oceana 1964) (1764).
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proper activity of sovereigns for which they ought not be
required to sacrifice their personal safety.42
Early jurisprudence on assassination can be said to focus on the legality of
targeting a head of state. It bears repeating that this is outside of the current
analysis because there is a consensus that such action during peaceful times is
prohibited under international law. Furthermore, the targeting of a head of
state during a time of war has generally been satisfactorily resolved under Jus
Belli, the Laws of War analysis. Although these early writers shed light on the
present issue, they are obviously not directly responsive to questions
concerning modem day terrorists.
2. Evolution of the International Laws of War in the Nineteenth and
Twentieth Centuries
The first efforts to codify the customary international law of war, including
concepts effecting assassination, appeared in the nineteenth century.43 The
official view of the U.S. Army (as demonstrated in the Leiber Code) in 1863
held that "the law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual
belonging to a hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the hostile govern-
ment, an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by any captor.. ."" The
Leiber Code declared that "civilized nations would look with horror upon
offers or rewards for the assassination of enemies as a relapse into
barbarism."' However, it was generally held "that in time of war every enemy
combatant was subject to attack anywhere and at anytime, so long as the
method of attack was consistent with the law of war." "It was immaterial
whether a given combatant was a private soldier, an officer, or even a monarch
or a member of [the monarch's] family. '47  Enemy heads of state and
important governmental officials who did not belong to the armed forces were
protected from attack in the same way as private enemy persons.48 The Hague
Regulations of 1907 codified the ban on assassinations in the context of war
under international law.49
42 Zengel, supra note 29, at 130.
43 See Zengel, supra note 29, at 130.
" Id. at 130.




49 See Jarni Melissa Jackson, The Legality of Assassination of Independent Terrorist
Leaders: An Examination of National and International Implications, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
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It can therefore be argued that assassination under customary international
law has been understood to mean the selected killing of an individual by
treacherous means. "'Treacherous means' include the procurement of another
to act treacherously and treachery itself is understood as a breach of duty of
good faith toward the victim.' 50 Although assassination under international
law was originally prohibited, changes over time began to permit selective
targeting of individuals. Consistent with the above interpretation, it could
therefore be argued that without an obligation of good faith to the individual,
such targeting is not treacherous, and accordingly the traditional prohibitions
on assassination would not be applicable.
Obviously, issues directly connected with the taking of human life are of
the utmost importance to civilized societies. Traditional legal theories
prohibited the assassination of a head of state during war. These theories were
premised on both the right of a sovereign to wage aggressive war, and on the
belief that assassination was treacherous and immoral. Concepts on the law
of war evolved during the twentieth century in regard to "lawful targets."
Enemy military leaders in times of war are now generally considered
appropriate targets whenever and wherever they are.
3. The Modern Concept of Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense
Assassination may be a potentially valid legal exercise of a state's right of
self-defense under international law.5 As has been established above, there
have existed, and currently are, specific and accepted prohibitions on the use
of force under international law. The U.N. Charter, the dominant legal
obligation, generally prohibits nations from using force or threatening to use
force within the boundaries of another sovereign nation. The Charter
explicitly creates an exception to this binding rule in matters of self-defense.52
This self-defense exception is widely accepted as a rule of customary
international law.
Historically, assassination was prohibited against individuals in times of
war due to theories connected with the rights of a monarchy and ideals of
chivalry. As modern times have progressed, rules of war have been further
detailed and codified. There are now understandings in regard to when an
COM. REG. 669, 671.
So Zengel, supra note 29, at 131.
5' See Schmitt, supra note 15, at 648 (stating that states should not be prevented from acting
in self-defense by targeting individual terrorists simply because the mode of conflict exists on
a different level).
52 See AREND & BECK, supra note 25.
[Vol. 30:1
LEGALIZING ASSASSINATION
individual is a "lawful target" in times of war, regardless of the question of
whether he is present on the battlefield.
Professor Beres has advanced significant arguments regarding a nation's
right to resort to assassination as a form of anticipatory self-defense." His
writings are particularly relevant to the present discussion. Professor Beres
acknowledges that generally the use of armed force within the territorial
boundaries of another state is prohibited under the U.N. Charter, and that this
peremptory norm of nonintervention "would ordinarily be violated by
transnational assassination."' " It is further recognized that in the absence of
a state of war, the assassination of an individual in one state upon the orders
of another state might also be considered terrorism."
The current analysis focuses on the legality of transnational assassination
as a form of anticipatory self-defense when no state of war exists. Professor
Beres highlights the fact that as the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including
Diplomatic Agents, is normally taken as a convention on terrorism, its
particular prohibitions on assassination are also relevant.56 However, it has
been argued that the assassination of an individual in another state may be a
lawful instance of anticipatory self-defense when it fulfills the general criteria
for self-defense under international law." The author notes that Professor
5' See Louis Rend Beres, On International Law and Nuclear Terrorism, 24 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1 (1994). See also Louis Rend Beres, On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-defense:
The Case of Israel, 20 HOFsTRA L. REv. 321 (1991).
5 Id. at 29 n.59.
55 See id.
' But see Michael N. Schmitt, State SponsoredAssassination in International and Domestic
Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 609 (Summer 1992). Schmitt states that there are only two treaties
which specifically address the topic of assassination, the Charter of the Organization of African
Unity and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents. While the first treaty is of questionable value
as to universal international law evolution, the latter (often referred to as the New York
Convention) "falls short of prescribing an international norm against assassination." Id. at 619.
Schmitt argues that the "major failing of the New York Convention is that it accords a target
protected status only when the target of the assassination is abroad. Thus, the murder of
protected individuals in their home territory do not trigger the treaty provisions." Id. Schmitt
argues further that "outside of the law of armed conflict, for instance, no universal prescription
outlaws assassination. The one document that addressed the topic, the New York Convention,
is limited in scope, and it fails even to mention the word assassination. Indeed it relies on
domestic law to criminalize the act." Id. at 678.
"' See Louis Rend Beres, On International Law and Nuclear Terrorism, 24 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMp. L. 29-33 (1994). Professor Beres relies upon Vattel for support of his arguments in
regard to the legality of assassination as a form of anticipatory self-defense. Beres cites Vattel
who argued that:
The safest plan is to prevent evil, where that is possible. A Nation has the
2001]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Beres' arguments in favor of the legality of assassination are by no means
universally accepted.1
8
There is also a significant controversy as to whether Article 51 of the UN
Charter requires an armed attack to actually occur before the right to self-
defense arises or if this is too restrictive an interpretation. Beres has argued
that:
this interpretation ignores the fact that international law
cannot reasonably compel a state to wait until it absorbs a
devastating or even lethal first strike before acting to protect
itself. Moreover, in the nuclear age-when waiting to be
struck first may be equivalent to accepting annihilation-the
right of anticipatory self-defense is especially apparent.5 9
In light of the potential for devastating terrorist attacks involving WMD,
the right of self-defense has been argued to include the option of assassination.
Beres accurately points out that:
[a]lthough the idea of assassination as a remedy is normally
dismissed as an oxymoron under international law, there are
circumstances wherein it would be decidedly rational and
right to resist the injury another seeks to inflict upon it, and to use force and
every other just means of resistance against the aggressor. It may even
anticipate the other's design, being careful, however, not to act upon vague
and doubtful suspicions, lest it should run the risk of becoming itself the
aggressor.
Id. at 31.
s In support of these very controversial propositions, Professor Beres convincingly cites
Cicero's defense of Milo:
But is there any occasion on which it is proper to slay a man-and there are
many such-surely that occasion is not only a just one, but even a necessary
one, when violence is offered, and can only be repelled by violence... What
is the meaning of our retinues, what of our swords? Surely it would never be
permitted to have them if we might never use them. This, therefore, is a law,
O judges, not written, but born with us-which we have not learned, or
received by tradition, or read, but which we have taken and sucked in and
imbibed from nature herself; a law which.., is ingrained in us-namely, that
if our life be in danger from plots, or from open violence, or from the
weapons of robbers or enemies, every means of securing our safety is
honorable. For laws are silent when arms are raised, and do not expect
themselves to be waited for, when he who waits will have to suffer an
undeserved penalty before he can exact a merited punishment.
Id. at31 n.60.
'9 Id. at 32.
[Vol. 30:1
LEGALIZING ASSASSINATION
humane. If, for example, the perceived alternative to assassi-
nation as anticipatory self-defense is large-scale uses of
force-activities taking the form of defensive military
strikes-a utilitarian or balance of harms criterion could
surely favor assassination.'
The author suggests that, under international law, modem day terrorists are
hostes humani generis--common enemies of humankind. In the fashion of
pirates, who were said by Vattel, "to be hanged by the first person into whose
hands they fell." Equally, terrorists are international outlaws and must fall
within the scope of this universal jurisdiction.
D. Conclusion
It is safe to conclude that assassination has traditionally been prohibited
under international law. However, the early fathers of international law
primarily focused their discussions on assassination in times of war and in
regard to heads of state. However, compelling arguments can be made that the
timely and proportionate use of force directed at specific individual terrorists
by a government may meet the legal threshold for justifiable self-defense
under international law.6 There is a global consensus that nations that suffer
a terrorist attack are entitled to defend themselves in a timely and proportion-
ate manner.62 Unfortunately, most analyses dealing with the individual
targeting of terrorist have generally applied a traditional laws of war analytical
approach.63
60 Id. at 33.
61 See Schmitt, supra note 15, at 645 (concluding that "[w]hen targeting a specific individual
is based on a valid exercise of self-defense, killing that individual will rarely be considered
assassination, regardless of the applicable law governing assassination." This comment reflects
again the definitional problems related to this inquiry. Schmitt states that in the law of armed
conflict that assassination is the TREACHEROUS killing of a targeted individual) (emphasis
added).
62 See Arend & Beck, supra note 3, at 213, which summarizes scholarly opinion as:
Legal scholars who have examined the jus ad bellum dimension of the
terrorism question would appear to agree on at least four basic principles:
Virtually all recognize that (1) if it has suffered an armed attack by terrorist
actors, a state is entitled to defend itself forcibly; (2) a victim state's forcible
self-defense measures should be timely; (3) a victim state's forcible self-
defense measures should be proportionate; and (4) a victim state's forcible
self-defense measures should be discriminate and taken against targets
responsible in some way for the armed attack.
Id. at 213.
63 See Zengel, supra note 29, at 225 (arguing that what is commonly called assassination is
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The concept of terrorists as modem day pirates, in effect hosti humani
generis, are evolving with potentially considerable legal consequences.
Scholars have maintained that "acts of terrorism like acts of piracy should be
declared "crimes against humanity."'" The similarity between acts of terrorism
and piracy, under international law, are compelling, namely: (1) they fail to
recognize or act within the law of nations; (2) they use violence against
innocents to intimidate and to coerce governments; and (3) their actions
undermine the legal rules that civilized peoples have developed to guide the
conduct of nations.65
IV. ASSASSINATION UNDER U.S. LAW
A. International Law as Law of the United States
The primary focus of this section is to examine how United States domestic
law treats the question of assassination of terrorists on foreign lands by
employees of the U.S. intelligence community. This section will primarily
examine legislation considered by the U.S. Congress and one very important
Executive Order issued by the president. It is worth noting, however, that
there is not necessarily an artificial wall between international law and U.S.
law. The United States Constitution recognizes that international law and
federal statutes are supreme to the laws of the various states.' This establishes
international law as a co-equal as the highest law of the land under the
Constitution. Regardless, the following analysis will focus solely on acts of
the Congress and the president in regard to the question of whether U.S.
intelligence agencies should be permitted to conduct assassinations of
terrorists.
best treated as one of many means by which one nation may utilize force against another, and
should be considered permissible under the same circumstances and subject to the same
constraints that govern the use of force generally).
4Arend & Beck, supra note 3, at 167, 168 (citing Franz Paasache).
Id. (citing Paasache).
The US Constitution mandates at Article VI that US treaties are part of the supreme Law
of the Land. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2. Furthermore at Article I, Section 8, Congress has the
power to "define and punish... Offenses against the Law of Nations." (Using Law of Nations
as the 18th century terminology for International Law). Further, the US Supreme Court has held
that "International Law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts ofjustice ofappropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending on it are duly
presented for their determination." The Paquete Habana 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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B. The Church Committee
Perhaps surprising to many is the fact that the contemplated assassination
is not prohibited under U.S. law. As will be discussed below, the CIA is
prevented from conducting assassinations by order of the president. This was
not always so.
Approximately twenty years ago, CIA assassination attempts caused
considerable concern with the American public and on Capitol Hill.
Accordingly, the Church Committee was formed to investigate these issues.
The Church Committee, chaired by Senator Frank Church, conducted a
congressional investigation during the mid-1970's.67 The Committee
thoroughly investigated various allegations regarding U.S. involvement in
assassination attempts and recommended a statutory prohibition on such
conduct." However, no such law was passed.69
The Church Committee issued an internal report on alleged assassination
attempts in which it found that the United States Government was implicated
in five assassinations or attempted assassinations against foreign government
leaders since 1960.70 "Four of those instances involved plots to overthrow
governments dominated by the leaders targeted for assassination, the fifth was
an attempt to prevent a new government from assuming power. The interim
report noted varying degrees of U.S. involvement."7
One case investigated by the Church Committee was that of General Renee
Schneider of Chile, who died of injuries sustained during a kidnapping attempt
in 1970. "[The] Committee found that the CIA had been actively involved in
efforts to prevent Salvadore Allende from taking office as Chile's president,
and that General Schneider was thought to be an obstacle to that goal."72
67 See Schmitt, supra note 15, at 653.
" See Schmitt, supra note 15, at 651-61 (arguing that an analysis of the Committee's report
provides the following 6 conclusions: 1. Assassination is politically motivated; 2. Clandestine
or covert operations are more likely than overt actions to constitute assassination; 3. A ban on
assassination does not preclude support for coups in which an official may possibly be killed or
assassinated. Instead each operation must be evaluated contextually to determine the likelihood
of assassination; 4. A killing justified by imminent physical danger to the United States would
be unlikely to amount to assassination; 5. Assassination prohibitions are not limited to heads of
state, but cover a range of officials representing states and non-governmental organizations; 6.
The term assassination is not meant to cover operations during periods of armed conflict).
' Lori Damrosch, The US Constitution in its Third Century: Foreign Affairs Distribution
of Constitutional Authority: Covert Operations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 795, 800 (1989) (citing
Church Comm. Report, at 160, 448).
70 See Zengel, supra note 29, at 141 (citing S. Rep. No. 465, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. (1975))
[hereinafter Interim report].
7' Id. at 142.
2 Id. The Committee further found that the CIA had provided money and weapons to a
2001]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Another investigation was conducted regarding the death of President Diem
of South Vietnam. Although the United States encouraged and assisted a coup
d'etat by South Vietnamese military officers in 1963, it appears that Diem's
death, which occurred in the course of the coup, was unplanned and occurred
without prior U.S. knowledge."
In yet another investigation, this one relating to the Dominican Republic,
"the United States had supported and provided small numbers of weapons to
local dissidents with knowledge on the part of some U.S. officials that the
dissidents intended to kill President Trujillo."74 However, it was unclear
whether these were the weapons used in the assassination.
In two other cases, the Committee concluded that the CIA had actively and
deliberately planned to kill foreign leaders and, in both cases, it was unsuc-
cessful. The Congo's Premier Patrice Lumumba was ultimately killed by
individuals with no connection to the United States, and Fidel Castro has
survived to this day.7"
The Committee concluded that outside of war, assassination should be
rejected as a foreign policy option. As the primary reason, the Committee
cited the belief that assassination is "incompatible with American principle,
international order, and morality."'76 The Committee also correctly noted the
difficulty in predicting the ultimate effect of killing a foreign leader. The
report pointed to some of these potential effects, such as:
the danger that political instability following the leader's
death might prove to be an even greater problem for the
United States than the actual leader; the demonstrated
inability of a democratic government to ensure that covert
activities remain secret; and the possibility that the use of
assassination by the United States would invite reciprocal or
retaliatory action against American leaders.
number of anti-Allende military officers, including the group that attempted to kidnap General
Scheider. However, support was withdrawn from that particular group before the attempt was




76 See id. at 142.
" Id. at 142, 143.
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Although it may be argued that the report asserts that planned assassina-
tions which are instigated by the United States should be prohibited, the
Committee did state that U.S. assistance may sometimes be appropriate.7"
In addition to questioning the propriety of U.S. involvement in assassina-
tion, the interim report expressed concern regarding efforts to maintain
"plausible deniability," the deliberate use of ambiguous language, and
breakdowns in accountability by government officials.79
Based on its findings, the Committee recommended legisla-
tion that would have made it a criminal offense for anyone
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to assassinate,
attempt to assassinate, or conspire to assassinate a leader of
a foreign country with which the U.S. was not at war pursuant
to a declaration of war, or engaged in hostilities pursuant to
the War Powers Resolution.
No such statute was created. Some scholars have suggested that the failure of
Congress to enact legislation forbidding assassination might be interpreted as
implicit authority for the president to retain this action as a policy option.80
It is worth noting that the focus of the congressional investigations appear
to concern the propriety of assassinations in regard to heads of state, and not,
as per the current investigation, in regard to terrorists. However, due in no
small part to the lessons learned from the inquiries made by Congress, this
author will emphasize that if assassination of targeted foreign terrorists is to
be adopted as a public policy of the U.S. government, extensive oversight by
both the executive and legislative bodies must be ensured. The policy section
below addresses these concerns.
C. Executive Order 12333
The authority which prohibits assassination is not a "law" but rather a
presidential executive order."' Although this Executive Order stands as an
78 See id. (the report stated that "[c]oups involve varying degrees of risk of assassination.
The possibility of assassination .... is one of the issues to be considered in determining the
propriety of US involvement... This country was created by violent revolt against a regime
believed to tyrannous, and our founding fathers (the local dissidents of that era) received aid
from foreign countries.... we should not today rule out support for dissident groups seeking
to overthrow tyrants."). Zengel, supra note 29, at 143 (citing the Interim Report at 258).
"' See Zengel, supra note 29, at 144 (citing Interim Report at 6-7, 260-79).
so Id.
8 Exec. Order No. 12333 Sec. 2.11, 3 C.F.R. 213 (1981) ("No person employed by or acting
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important public statement of U.S. policy against assassination, it has been
argued that the president could countermand on his own authority. 2 It has
been argued that the lack of a statutory prohibition might indicate congressio-
nal approval to retain assassination as a policy option.83
In 1976, President Ford issued an executive order that barred U.S.
Government employees or agents from engaging in, or conspiring to engage
in, assassination." That prohibition was reissued without significant change
by Presidents Carter and Reagan, and is now embodied in Executive Order
12333 pertaining to United States intelligence activities.85
Executive Order 12333 specifically states "[n]o person employed by or
acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire
to engage in, assassination. No agency of the Intelligence community shall
participate in or request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this
order. ' '" Interestingly, the Order does not define assassination. It has been
argued that this prohibition is targeted against peacetime efforts by the U.S.
intelligence agency officials to cause the deaths of certain foreign persons
whose political activities were judged detrimental to U.S. security and foreign
policy objectives.8 7
"The Executive Order prohibiting assassination, in particular has-created
general uncertainty about the legality of using lethal force."88 It has been
argued that to the extent that these limitations are not in fact mandated by the
U.N. Charter, customary principles of international law, or the US Constitu-
tion, they are indefensible.89 Accordingly, if terrorism poses a threat to
national security to which the United States must respond effectively, then, to
succeed in this effort, policy planners and military strategists must be entitled
on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in,
assassination.").
82 See Damrosch, supra note 69, at 800 n.36 that "as a matter of constitutional power, the
president may countermand any constraints embodied in executive orders that he or his
predecessors may have issued. Whether an executive order should be rescinded in accordance
with the same procedures used to promulgate it, e.g. through publication in the Federal Register,
is an issue of procedural nicety rather than constitutional power."
3 Damrosch, supra note 69, at 800.
Exec. Order No. 12333 Sec. 2.11, 3 C.F.R. 213 (1981).
's See Zengel, supra note 29, at 144 (citing Exec. Order 12333).
86 Id. (citing Exec. Order No. 12333, 3 C.F.R. 213 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. Sec. 401
at 44-51 (1982)). Executive Order 12333 is a comprehensive document addressing the conduct
of intelligence operations with the prohibition on assassination as only one issue which is briefly
addressed.
87 See Zengel, supra note 29, at 145.
s Abraham Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law:




"to as much flexibility as possible in combating an enemy that accepts no
limits based on law, but only those imposed by an effective defense.""
D. Conclusion
Assassination, as traditionally viewed, was prohibited under international
law, although there is no consensus as to an express and specific current
prohibition. Executive Order 12333 prevents members of the United States
Intelligence Community from participating in assassination attempts.
However, this Executive Order is not law and can be unilaterally revoked by
the president.9' Furthermore, under the current international law paradigm, as
created by the UN Charter, it is possible to make a good faith argument that,
under certain circumstances, assassination of terrorists may be permissible as
a form of self-defense. Moreover, the failure of the U.S. Congress to
criminalize such assassinations may be seen as passive consent to such
operations if needed. Accordingly, it may be argued that assassinations, as
currently viewed, are permissible under both international and U.S. domestic
law.
Therefore, the next area of inquiry must be whether the adoption of this
option would be a sound foreign policy choice-if it is indeed permissible.
9o Sofaer, supra note 88, at 91. See also W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive
Order 12333 and Assassination, 1989-DEC ARMY LAW. 4, which concluded that:
clandestine, low visibility or overt use of military force against legitimate
targets in time of war, or against similar targets in time of peace where such
individuals or groups pose an immediate threat to United States citizens or the
national security of the United States, as determined by competent authority,
does not constitute assassination or conspiracy to engage in assassination, and
would not be prohibited by the proscription in [Executive Order] 12333 or by
international law.
Id. at 1.
"' It has been argued that a U.S. president could legally carry out the assassination of a
foreign leader in 4 ways: (1) Ask Congress to declare war, in which case a foreign leader
exercising command responsibility would become a legitimate target; (2) Construe Article 51
of the United Nations Charter to permit the assassination based on either a right to self-defense
or a right to respond to criminal activities; (3) Narrowly interpret the order as not restricting the
president as long as he does not approve specific plans for the killing of individuals; or (4)
Overrule the order, create an exception to it, or permit the Congress to do the same. Boyd M.
Johnson, Executive Order 12333: The Permissibility ofan American Assassination of a Foreign
Leader, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 401,403 (1992).
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V. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
The question of the legality of assassination of foreign terrorists by U.S.
intelligence personnel is quite a different matter than whether it is sound
policy. As has been demonstrated above, such use of force may be permissible
under international law, and yet not criminalized under U.S. law. An
examination of the policy options involved should, at a minimum, include an
overview of the agency or agencies that would be expected to conduct the
activities required.
A. The CIA-An Overview
The United States Intelligence Community consists of 13 separate agencies,
both civilian and military.92 This article will focus on the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). The CIA, established by the National Security Act of 1947, is
led by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who manages the CIA in
addition to serving as head of the Intelligence Community. 3 The CIA is an
independent agency, responsible to the president through the DCI, and is
accountable to the American people through the intelligence oversight
committees of the U.S. Congress."
The CIA's mission is to provide foreign intelligence on national security
topics, and to conduct counterintelligence activities, special activities, and
other functions related to foreign intelligence and national security, as directed
by the president.9" The CIA collects foreign intelligence information through
a variety of clandestine and overt means. The CIA, its "special activities" that
are directed by the president, and specifically the case officer (or operations
officer), are of central concern to the present question.
B. The Directorate of Operations and "Special Activities"
The CIA is composed of four sections-the Directorate of Administration,
the Directorate of Science and Technology, the Directorate of Intelligence, and
the Directorate of Operations (also known as the "Clandestine Service"). Of
these, the Directorate of Operations (DO) has the task of covertly executing
foreign policy, and is the section that would most likely be responsible for
conducting assassinations of foreign terrorists. In fact, the DO and the military






are the two primary organizations designated to take covert action under
Executive Order 12333.9 It is the DO, therefore, that would most likely be
ordered to carry out such clandestine operations.
The president has the authority through the National Security Council to
direct the CIA to perform "other functions and duties related to intelligence
affecting the national security."'9
This has been interpreted to include authority to order covert
activities that sometimes violate the laws of the country in
which they take place and some which involve the use of
force or violence. The President's freedom to act in this area
has been somewhat restricted by measures designed to
increase congressional oversight of covert activities, but those
restrictions are more procedural than substantive. If the
President made the required finding that a given course of
action was important to national security and assuming the
required reports were provided to Congress, a covert opera-
tion that involved the killing of a specific foreign terrorist
leader or other person would not likely be illegal under
United States law."
Furthermore, Executive Order 12333 is subject to modification or rescission
by the president at any time." Accordingly, a finding by the president, with
direction to an intelligence agency to assassinate a foreign terrorist, arguably
would result in the constructive rescission of any conflicting provision of
Executive Order 12333.'
°°
The 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act increased reporting requirements to
Congress, and specifically to the Senate and House Select Committees on
Intelligence. These reported requirements included current and anticipated
intelligence activities. ' Significantly, the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act
does not require approval of the intelligence committees as a condition
Specifically, the Order states at 1.8 (3), concerning the CIA, that CIA may conduct
"special activities" approved by the president. No agency except the CIA (or the Armed Forces
of the United States in time of war declared by Congress or during any period covered by a
report from the president to the Congress under the War Powers Resolution) may conduct any
special activity unless the president determines that another agency is more likely to achieve a
particular objective. Exec. Order. No. 12333, supra note 81.
' Zengel, supra note 29, at 146 n.78.
hId.
See Zengel, supra note 29, at 146 n.7.
10 See id.
101 Danrosch, supra note 69, at 798 (citing 50 U.S.C. Sec. 413(a)(1)).
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precedent to the initiation of any such anticipated intelligence activity.'°2 This
failure to reserve the power to authorize covert operations has been equated by
some as a disclaimer by Congress of any responsibility for deciding whether
to authorize specific covert operations.0 3
The Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 changed the definition of
"covert action" as an activity of the United States Government to influence
political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the
role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledge
publicly, but it does not include activities the primary purpose of which is to
acquire intelligence, or traditional counterintelligence activities.,'°
C. Conclusion
The United States Intelligence Community is a diverse system consisting
of 13 organizations, both civilian and military. The Central Intelligence
Agency, specifically its Directorate of Operations, is the organization that has
been ordered to conduct "special activities," which may include the covert use
of force in foreign countries. Furthermore, there are now established
congressional oversight mechanisms for review of covert actions. Lastly,
Executive Order 12333 may either be repealed by the president or otherwise
countermanded, if there was a presidential finding that the assassination of a
foreign terrorist was in the interest of national security.
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The assassination of known terrorists (who are not state leaders) in a
foreign nation by CIA personnel arguably is not prohibited under U.S. or
international law. As this action is not necessarily illegal, it is important to
discuss the costs and benefits of adopting this option as an instrument of
official U.S. governmental policy.
A. Policy Considerations in Any Covert Action
The author contends that covert operations in general, and any contem-
plated assassination operations, should be examined on a case-by-case basis
by a bipartisan group of executive-legislative overseers.0 5 The establishment
2 See id.
" See Zengel, supra note 29, at 147.
04 50 U.S.C.A. § 413b(e) (1996).




of such a panel could be composed of members of the National Security
Council, and the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, and could lead
to some accepted standards that provide general guidance to the deliberations.
Current available scholarly literature provides certain guidelines to be
considered when evaluating a proposed covert operation. These considerations
include investigation of diplomatic options, compatibility with publicly stated
policy options, and weighing the severity of the operation."°
B. Assassination as a Permissible Covert Intelligence Operation?
There are tremendously strong arguments on both sides of the debate as to
whether the United States should authorize members of its intelligence
agencies to commit assassinations of foreign terrorists. The most common
arguments in favor of assassination of terrorists can be described as follows:
(1) Assassination may preclude greater evil;
'o' See id. at 306. The author suggests eleven specific guidelines, namely:
1. Whenever possible, shun covert operations in favor of diplomatic
resolution of international disputes.
2. Keep covert operations in harmony with publicly stated policy objectives.
3. Conduct only those covert operations which, if exposed, would not unduly
embarrass the United States.
4. Consult with intelligence analysts and other experts not just covert action
specialists before proceeding.
5. Never bypass established decisionmaking procedures, including reporting
requirements (which, except in times of acute emergency ought to be
prospective, not merely retrospective).
6. Never violate the laws of the United States (short of the rare Lincolnesque
need to save the nation in a time of desperation).
7. Against fellow democracies eschew all but the most routine of covert
operations.
8. Even against nondemocratic regimes, remain at the lower, less intrusive,
end of the escalation ladder, applying the just war rule of proportionality
and rising upward only in despair.
9. Reject arrangements for information sharing or other intelligence activities
with any nation practicing, or allowing within its territory a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.
10. In almost all cases, reject secret wars, coups d'etat and other extreme
measures, for if America's interests are so jeopardized as to require major
forceful intervention, properly authorized overt warfare-ideally, multina-
tional in nature and at the invitation of a legitimate government or faction is
a more appropriate and honorable option.
11. In considering covert operations, always remember above all the importance
to the United States of its longstanding tradition of fair play.
Id. at 306.
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(2) Assassination produces fewer casualties than retaliation
with conventional weapons;
(3) Assassination would be aimed at the persons directly
responsible for terrorist attacks;
(4) Assassination of terrorist leaders would disrupt terrorist
groups more than any other form of attack; and
(5) Assassination leaves no prisoners to become causes for
further terrorist attacks.
107
The first point, that assassination may preclude greater evil, may be illustrated
using the example that it would have been better to kill Hitler before World
War H and the holocaust. The flaw noted with this premise is that hindsight
is 20-20 vision, and it is difficult to determine when and if this action is
appropriate before the actual harm occurs. Furthermore, it can be noted that
an environment in which Hitler could rise to power would be just as conducive
to his underlings who would be motivated to promote the same agenda. 08
However, there is a definite appeal to the argument that it is a lesser evil to kill
one individual terrorist, than to have innocent civilians harmed-potentially
from the use of weapons of mass destruction.
The argument that assassination may result in fewer casualties compared
to a military operation, and that it is a more precise weapon, is also difficult
to refute."° Furthermore, even opponents of assassination as a national
security option agree that the assassination of a known terrorist leader can have
a significant impact on the disruption of a criminal organization."' The
confusion and great potential for infighting when a leader of a terrorist group
is eliminated is also a strong argument for association as an effective weapon
in defending national security interests. Less convincing is the argument that
having terrorists in jail serves as a motivation for further acts of violence, and
that assassination of the terrorist therefore removes this motivation for
potential future attacks.
Perhaps one of the most frequently made counterpoints to assassination is
the fact that it could lead to the justification for further acts of violence against
107 BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, RAND CORP., SHOULD OUR ARSENAL AGAINST TERRORISM
INCLUDE ASSASSINATION (1987). Although Jenkins plainly states his position against
assassination, he did note that a public opinion poll conducted just before the US air raid on
Libya showed that 61 percent of the respondents agreed that the United States should "covertly
assassinate known terrorist leaders." See also Schmitt, supra note 15, at 666, 667.
o See Johnson, supra note 105, at 308.
'o See JENKINS, supra note 107, at 3.
"o See id. The death of Wadi Haddad is cited as evidence that one leader's death can result
in a long period of inaction by a terrorist group.
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America."' Closely combined with this consideration is the fact that
proponents of terrorism, who may hide, have an advantage over democratically
elected officials who must be available to the public." 2 Therefore, reasoning
is that the assassination of terrorists would bring reprisals against U.S. leaders,
and that such leaders are inherently more vulnerable due to the nature of our
democracy."' This may be a compelling argument, however, it certainly has
flaws. To suggest that terrorist leaders would only be motivated to attack a
U.S. leader if assassination was ordered is obviously false.
Furthermore, it is a questionable argument that terrorists may be able to
provide better security for themselves than that provided by the combined
forces of the federal government. It may also be said that a successful
operation, in effect one which stopped the leaders of a terrorist group, would
by definition prevent retaliation against the United States. It is also worth
noting that this factor of potential retaliation already exists for any action,
including overt operations, by the government. The potential for attempted
revenge by terrorists may also be a valid factor for our elected officials to
consider. This would most assuredly prevent our leaders from making crucial
foreign policy decisions too lightly-specifically including the authorization
of the assassination of an individual. Lastly, perhaps it should be noted that
we expect certain sacrifices from our officials, which may include possibly
placing themselves in danger due to decisions that need to be made in order to
protect the nation. Another factor to be considered is that nations that declare
a policy against assassination are more likely to be the subject of assassination
attempts by other nations."4The most compelling argument against assassination, from the author's
perspective, is that the targeted killing of an individual, not in time of war and
with no due process protections, is morally wrong. A position, which is
similar to the one which argues that assassination is morally wrong, is the
principle that, in combating terrorism, we ought not to employ actions
indistinguishable from those of the terrorists themselves. That is to say that
by resorting to this clandestine use of force we become no better than our
opponents. It may be fairly said that the United States does not necessarily
oppose the causes of certain terrorist groups but that we find their practices,
e.g. car bombs, to be repugnant; and that this is the difference between our
111 Id. at 7.
112 id.
..Id. at 7, 8.
" See Zengel, supra note 29, at 144 (citing David Newman & Tyll van Geel, Executive
Order 12333: The Risks of a Clear Declaration oflntent, 12 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 433,443-
47 (1989) (stating that the authors' use of game theory analysis disregards the fact that a nation
with a policy against assassination can retaliate by other means)).
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nation and such criminal groups. However, this does not appear to recognize
that the victims of terrorist acts are often innocents, while no such claim can
be made concerning eliminations of such terrorist leaders.
C. Possible Implementation
A central concern must be that if the assassination of known dangerous
terrorists were officially part of the U.S. policy who then would issue the
orders? As briefly discussed above, the author suggests that, at a minimum,
the president would have to make an official finding similar to that necessary
to launch a covert operation. Although notification to the leaders of Congress
is not necessary before a covert operation is initiated, in a matter this grave, it
certainly would be prudent. In these most serious of matters, communication
and agreement between the executive and legislative leaders becomes more
than reasonable. The framework and scenario are fairly easy to comprehend.
If the U.S. Intelligence Community became aware of a known terrorist abroad
and his imminent plans to attack crucial American interests or U.S. citizens,
then the president would be so advised. There would have to be a finding that
the individual was not in a position to be arrested, detained, or otherwise
prevented from carrying out the attack. It is assumed that arrest and/or
extradition from the host state is not an available option. Although the
possibility does not exist of arresting the terrorist, an assassination can feasibly
be performed. The president would need to make a specific finding regarding
the applicable facts and would be obligated under the law to consult with, for
example, the leaders of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees.
Additionally, as discussed above, the creation of a permanent panel composed
of, for example, the senior members of the National Security Council and the
majority and minority leaders of both houses of Congress, as well as the two
Intelligence Committees, would appear prudent. Upon congressional approval,
the CIA could implement the order based on the president's finding.
The creation of such a mechanism would be an undeniably dramatic change
in U.S. policy. Such a significant change in public policy must only be
implemented after vigorous, informed, and public debate by our elected
representatives.
VII. CONCLUSION
In summary, it is traditionally argued that assassination is prohibited under
international law. However, as has been discussed above, although generally
treated as prohibited conduct, arguments may be made that under certain
conditions the assassination of known terrorists is not a violation of interna-
tional law. As to domestic law, it has been clearly demonstrated that
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assassinations of terrorists abroad conducted by intelligence officers are
potentially permissible under U.S. law. An executive order exists which
currently prohibits such covert operations. However, despite extensive
hearings by Congress, no law has been created which prohibits this foreign
policy option.
It may be argued, in light of the severe threats posed by terrorists armed
with biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, that it makes no sense to
preserve a special and unique protection for verifiable enemies of the country
at the possible expense of the lives and well-being of hundreds or thousands
of others. Similarly, in the contexts of domestic law and the U.S. policy, it
serves little purpose to rule out any particular action as a future option when
the issues and circumstances that may then be present are as yet unknown.
There are varying degrees ofjustification for the use of force when a nation's
vital interests are threatened, and current Executive Order 12333 has been
described as unnecessarily limiting the flexibility of U.S. foreign policy
options.'
5
The question that remains is whether this potential change in policy would
be effective in protecting America, its citizens, and its ideals.
"S See Zengel, supra note 29, at 155.
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